Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Rodney L. Phillips v. JCM Development Corp et al
: Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Paul W. Mortensen; Harold R. Stephens; Harry E. Snow; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Phillips v. JCM Development Co., No. 18211 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2883

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
)

JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; JAMES C.)
McGARRY, JR.; LINDA McGARRY;
JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba J. G. )
REALTY; JAMES GLEASON:
ROBERT G. ANDERSON; UNITED
FARM AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation; CLAN STILSON;
and DOES I through XV,

Case No. 18211

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, HONORABLE BOYD
BUNNELL PRESIDING
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
131 East 100 South
P. 0. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532
Attorney for Respondent
JACKSON HOWARD and
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for DefendantAppellant UFA, inc., a
Utah corporation

FI l ED
JUN - 41982
~

........... ·--·--··--------------·--~

CJerk. Su;ir~~, Co!.!ri, Ut:.:~1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
)

JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; JAMES C.)
McGARRY, JR.; LINDA McGARRY;
JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba J. G. )
REALTY; JAMES GLEASON:
ROBERT G. ANDERSON; UNITED
FARM AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation; CLAN STILSON;
and DOES I through XV,

Case No. 18211

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, HONORABLE BOYD
BUNNELL PRESIDING
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
131 East 100 South
P. 0. Box 339
Moab, Utah 84532
Attorney for Respondent
JACKSON HOWARD and
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON
P. 0. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Attorney for DefendantAppellant UFA, inc., a
Utah corporation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE----------------------

1

COURT-------------~-------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL----------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS-----------------------------------

2

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST
UNITED FARM AGENCY IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE---------------- 14

POINT II:

THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER PAID FOR
OVER $185,000.00 IN ASSETS BECAUSE
OF UNITED FARM AGENCY'S NEGLIGENCE
AND BREACHES OF DUTIES-------------- 24

POINT II(A):

THE PLAINTIFF HAD CAPACITY TO SUE
BECAUSE HE OWNED THE ASSETS OF WHICH
HE WAS DEFRAUDED AND WAS PERSONALLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEBTS WHICH WERE
ASSUMED BUT NOT PAID. ALSO, THE LAW
DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE TRUSTEE IN
BANKRUPTCY BE SUBSTITUTED AS THE
PLAINTIFF IN A PENDING ACTION------- 26

POINT II(B):

THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS IS UNAVAILABLE TO UNITED
FARM AGENCY BECAUSE NO AFFIRMATIVE
PLEADING OR OBJECTION RESERVED THE
RIGHT TO RAISE THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
AND FURTHER BECAUSE THE DEFENSE
COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO UNITED
FARM AGENCY IN ANY EVENT------------ 30

POINT III:

THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN THE JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT
ANDERSON FOR BREACHES OF DUTIES
OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF--------------- 33

CASES CITED

Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., Utah, 548 P2d
898 (1976)-------------------------------------------- 31
Diversified General Corporation v. White Barn Golf
Course, Inc., Utah, 584 P2d 848 (1978)---------------- 17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-i- by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Dugan v. Jones, Utah, 615 P2d 1239 (1980)---------------Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company v. Professional United
World Travel Association (WTA), Inc., Utah, 529
P2d 586 (1979)-------------------~---------~---------
Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P2d 815 (1981)-----------Morely v. J. Pagel R~alty & Insurance, 27 Ariz. App.
62, 550 P2d 1104 (1976)------------------------------Shirley v. Venaglia, 86 N.M. 721, 527 P2d 316 (1974)---~
Smith v. Carroll Realty Company, 8 Utah 2d 356, 335
P2d 67 (1959)----------------------------------------Smith v. Castlemen, 81 N.M. 1, 462 P2d 135 (1969)-------Wells v. Walker Bank and Trust Co., Utah, 590 P2d
1261 (1979)------------------------------------------Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P2d 32
(1965)-------------------------------------------------

23, 37
30
38
26, 36
30
37
30
22
18

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-2 (1953, as amended)--------------- 17
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-6(a)
(1953, as amended)------------ 23
Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11(14)
(1953, as amend~d)---------- 23
RULES CITED
Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary
Rule 2-110(2)----------------------------------------Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 610-----------------Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(c)----------------Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h)---------------Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(a)(l)-------------Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21-----------~------Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4---------------------------

23
29
31
31
29
30
31

AUTHORITIES CITED
3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, §267-------------------------------9 Am Jur 2d, Bankruptcy, §157---------------------------12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §96------------------------------Restatement of Agency, Second §406-----------------------

14
29
24, 32
15.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-iiLibrary Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
RODNEY L. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
JCM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation; JAMES c.
McGARRY, JR.,; LINDA McGARRY;
JAMES R. GLAVAS, dba J. G.
REALTY; JAMES GLEASON;
ROBERT G. ANDERSON; UNITED
FARM AGENCY, INC., a Utah
corporation; CLAN STILSON;
and DOES I through XV,

Case No. 18211

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant,
United Farm Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, for damages arising
out of a real estate transaction.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on the
29th and 30th day of July, 1981.

The Court granted judgment in

favor of the Plaintiff on July 30, 1981, against all of the defendants except Linda McGarry and took under advisement the amount
of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff.

On September 4, 1981,

the Court filed its Memorandum Decision (R. 213-215), and on
October 14, 1981, the Court signed and filed its Findings of Fact,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 232-243).
The Defendant, United Farm Agency, filed its Motion for a
New Trial which was denied by the Court by its Order filed December 24, 1981 (R. 285).

The notice of appeal was filed on January8,

1982 (R. 304).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent requests that the trial court's decision be
affirmed in all respects and that he be awarded his costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff operated a construction business in Moab, Utah,
from 1970 until he was defrauded of his business in 1978 (Tr. 242243).
The Plaintiff's first dealings with United Farm Agency
occurred in 1976 (Tr. 7).

At that time, Mitch Williams, a United

Farm Agency agent, approached the Plaintiff about purchasing the
Grand Valley Motel and Silver Dollar office building, which had
been listed with United Farm Agency.

The purchase was consummated

with the help of Robert Anderson, United Farm's local representative,
and Anderson, in lieu of receiving a monetary commission from the
seller, received free rent in an office the Plaintiff renovated
in the Silver Dollar office building (Tr. 8, 133).
SALE OF MOTEL AND OFFICE BUILDING
The Plaintiff and Anderson had occasion to see each other
on a day to day basis during the months that renovation of the
office building occurred and a good relationship evolved between
Robert Anderson and the Plaintiff (Tr. 9-10, 134).

On June 14,

1977, the Plaintiff listed the Grand Valley Motel and Silver Dollar
office building with United Farm Agency through Anderson because
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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of his daily contact with Anderson and because Anderson had helped
him draw up the papers when he bought the motel (Tr. 134-135; Ex. 2).
On June 23, 1977, the Plaintiff listed the office building separately with United Farm Agency.

Each listing was executed on a

United Farm Agency form (Tr. 10-11; Ex. 2, 5).
At the end of November, 1977, United Farm Agency and Anderson produced a prospective buyer for the Plaintiff's motel and
office building.

A Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale was

signed by the propective buyer and the Plaintiff on a United Farm
Agency form (Ex. 4).

However, the sale failed to close and the

earnest money was returned to the prospective buyer to the Plaintiff's displeasure (Tr. 12, 13, 411; Ex. 4).
Other buyers for the motel and office building were subsequently introduced to the Plaintiff by Anderson and the parties
entered into a Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale on a United
Farm Agency form on March 27, 1978 (Ex. 10).

The agreed price for

the motel and office building was $200,000.00 with $2,000.00 earnest money placed by the buyers.

Because the Plaintiff had re-

ceived no earnest money when the earlier sale fell through, the
Plaintiff required that the $2,000.00 be released to him prior to
closing in return for his property being tied up (Tr. 403-404, 411).
The sale closed on May 8, 1978, and United Farm Agency received
a $20,000.00 commission of which $10,000.00 went to Anderson (Tr. 19,
20-21).

Financing for the purchase of the motel was arranged

through RLC, which Anderson testified is a parent or subsidiary
corporation of United Farm Agency which provides financing for
United Farm Agency transactions (T. 22-23; Ex. 10, 11, 12)~

-3-
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HOME AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LISTED
In the meantime, back in January 1978, the Plaintiff had
also listed his home and construction company with United Farm
Agency through Anderson for a combined sales price of $275,000.00
(Tr. 14-15; Ex. 6).

Anderson had prepared letters on United Farm

Agency's stationary to send to prospective buyers for the home
and construction business, and the home and construction company
were advertised in United Farm Agency's national listing service
catalogue (Tr.

16~17,

24; Ex. 7-8).
HOME SOLD

A buyer for the home was found through United Farm Agency's
national listing catalogue and the closing occurred on or about
June 29, 1978.

The home sold for $75,000.00 and United Farm

Agency received a commission of $4,500.00, of which Anderson received one-half (Tr. 25).

As in the case of the sale of the motel

and office building, the Plaintiff again required that the earnest
money be released to pim early in return for his property being
tied up and his request was again accommodated by the buyer,
Anderson and the attorney handling the closing (Tr. 405, 411;
Ex. 13).
The construction company was re-listed for one year with
United Farm Agency on June 23, 1978.

The list price was lowered

from the previous asking price of $200,000.00 to $185,000.00.
Additionally, the business shop building was listed separately for
$70,000.00 (Ex. 14, 15).

The Plaintiff at this time advised

Anderson that his company was having cash flow problems and that
a prospective buyer should have $50,000.00 cash available to meet
the monthly cash turn over.

As with the prior listing, the Plain-

tiff agreed to remain with the company for six months in order to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library.
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provide a contractor's license and to assure the continuity and
the good name of the business the Plaintiff had built (Tr. 30-32,
141, 147, 279).

Although the Plaintiff was having cash flow

problems, his company had plenty of assets which could be liquidated
to pay off debts (Tr. 289).
PURCHASER FOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
On July 17, 1978, Anderson expecting to receive a commission,
presented to the Plaintiff as a prospective purchaser of the Plaintiff's construction company one James C. McGarry acting as president of JCM Development Corporation.

McGarry was represented by

James Gleason, a real estate agent for J. G. Realty (Tr. 36-38, 41).
Anderson, McGarry, Gleason and a Gerald (Bud) Stocks, who had intraduced McGarry and Gleason

to

Anderson, all examined some of the

Plaintiff's jobs and equipment and then went to the Plaintiff's
office where they reviewed the Plaintiff's business records (T. 40).
The Plaintiff asked Anderson if JCM had the $50,000.00 liquidity
necessary to maintain continued operations of his company and
Anderson assured the Plaintiff that ''money was no problem with
these people" and that the buyers were worth millions of dollars
(Tr. 138, 141, 279).

Anderson advised the Plaintiff that JCM was

willing to pay $200,000.00 for his construction company (Tr. 235)
and further advised the Plaintiff that he should not liquidate
any assets to meet current obligations since the assets would be
1

part of a sure sale to JCM (Tr. 287-288) .

1 Because of the Plaintiff's good credit, his bank honored
checks even when his account temporarily had insufficient funds
(Tr. 361,372).
The Plaintiff's business had handled $714,000.00
in contracts in 1977 (Tr. 293-294; Ex. 42).
-5- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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On the morning of July 18, all of the parties, except
Stocks, again met at the Plaintiff's office and examined more
equipment and further examined the business records.

Anderson at

trial admitted that at this time he still expected United Farm
Agency to received a commission in the event of sale (Tr. 41-42).
Sale negotiations continued on and off throughout the 18th
to late afernoon, Anderson negotiating on behalf of the Plaintiff
and expecting to receive a commission.

At 5:00 or 6:00 in the

evening in a meeting at the United Farm Agency office, Anderson told
the Plaintiff that McGarry and Gleason were satisfied with the information they had seen and were ready to make a deal (Tr. 144).
By this time Anderson and United Farm Agency had also entered into
their own deal with McGarry, unbeknown to the Plaintiff (Tr. 58,
248). 2

The understanding reached between the Plaintiff and McGarry

2 Prior in the afternoon Anderson, for himself and for United
Farm Agency, had signed an Earnest Money Agreement with McGarry
wherein JCM agreed to purchase 20 acres of land owned jointly by
Anderson and United Farm Agency for $100,000.00, which land was to
be developed by JCM into a mobile home park by using the Plaintiff's
construction company to do the construction work (Tr. 60, 63-64).
It was further anticipated that United Farm Agency would exclusively
list and sell the mobile home lots, and that United Farm Agency and
Anderson would ultimately handle upwards of two million dollars in
sales (Tr. 62, 64-66, 69).
The acreage involved had been received by Anderson and United
Farm Agency as a commission from a prior sale. With United Farm
Agency's approval, the land had been mortgaged to First Security
Bank on December 21, 1977 to secure a $25,000.00 loan taken by
Anderson (Tr. 32-34, 61; Ex. 16-17). As of July 18, 1978, Anderson
was several months delinquent in making the agreed payments and
needed to find a buyer for the 20 acres to pay off the loan.
JCM
offered him the opportunity to pay off the loan and still have
nearly $25,000.00 (the remainder of his $50,000.00 one-half of the
purchase price) ,(Tr. 55-58). Anderson admitted that he was very
much hopeful that JCM would purchase the 20 acres (Tr. 37). Also·
by this time, McGarry, Gleason and Anderson had agreed that United
Farm Agency's $20,000.00 commission from the Plaintiff's sale would
be split with $5,000.00 to go to Anderson and, implicitly, $5,000.00
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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called for the Plaintiff to receive $200,000.00 for his business as
previously listed, plus a 1.7 acre lot to be included which had not
been listed (Ex. 18).
ANDERSON "STEPS ASIDE"
When it came time to reduce the understanding to writing
Gleason called Anderson out of the presence of the Plaintiff and
said his form was simpler and that Anderson should let him handle
the sale.

Gleason also stated that he

closing as a stock transfer.

intended to handle the

Anderson stated that a stock trans-

fer was not the proper way to handle the sale and that the bulk
sales act should be complied with.

Gleason told Anderson to "step

aside" and said, "I know how to handle this deal.
handle it".

Just let me

Anderson then acquiesced, "Mainly because Gleason

didn't want me to" (do the sale) and because of the prior deal
worked out between JCM, United Farm Agency and Anderson which
offered United Farm Agency and Anderson a potential two million
dollars in real estate

sal~s

and lots of attractive possibilites

for the future (Tr. 47-48, 69, 145, 256).
When Gleason and Anderson rejoined the Plaintiff no explanation was given by Anderson to the Plaintiff as to why a J. G.
Realty form was being used (T. 51).

When the Plaintiff asked what

to United Farm Agency and $10,000.00 to J. G. Realty (Tr. 44, 145,
161.
While the Plaintiff later learned that Anderson and United
Farm Agency had made a deal with JCM, he was never told by Anderson
of the delinquent note (Tr. 116-117, 155-156). After the Plaintiff's company was turned over to JCM an article appeared in the
August 24, 1978 Moab Times Independent announcing that a mobile
home subdivision was to be developed by JCM with lots to be sold and
financed by United Farm Agency.
The article also stated that the
Plaintiff's construction company would be used to develop the subdivision.
(Tr. 64-66, 110).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was happening Anderson told him that there was to be a commission
split between brokers with Anderson to receive $5,000.00 of the
$20,000.00 commission (Tr. 145-146, 44).
UNITED FARM AGENCY'S POSITION
At trial Anderson, Clan Stilson (the United Farm Agency broker),
and United Farm all took the position that Anderson had expressed
concern over the need to comply with the bulk sales act in the
PLaintiff's presence although Anderson admitted that the Plaintiff
"may or may not have been present" when the discussion occurred.
The Plaintiff denied being present (T. 47, 49, 256).

Anderson,

Stilson and United Farm further contended that once the parties
seemed intent on proceeding contrary to Anderson's advice, Anderson
determined that he was no longer going to represent the Plaintiff
and from that point on United Farm Agency no longer expected to
receive a commission (although a $20,000.00 commission appeared
when the closing instruments were prepared by Anderson and the
Plaintiff had no obligation whatsoever to pay a commission to J. G.
Realty) (Tr. 51, 126, 161, 198; Ex. 18).
Contrary to the foregoing position, Anderson admitted at trial
that he never told the Plaintiff that he was no longer going to
represent him (Tr. 53-54, 107).

Contrary to the foreoing position,

Anderson admitted that he never told the Plaintiff that he had done
wrong in entering into the Earnest Money Agreement with JCM (Tr. 53).
Also contrary to the foregoing positon, Anderson admitted that
despite his disagreement with Gleason over how a sale should be
handled, there was no hesitation on his part to go ahead on the
multi-million dollar deal between JCM, himself and United Farm Agency,
the beginning of which had been executed on a J. G. Realty form
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(Tr. 58; Ex. 19) .
EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
The earnest money agreement signed on July 18, 1978 by the
Plaintiff and McGarry, as president for JCM, called for the Plaintiff to receive $200,000.00 as follows:

$40,000.00 cash down;

a

five year 10% note for $38,750.00; the balance to be paid by JCM
assuming existing loans on the company, building and equipment in
the amount of $121,250.00 (Ex. 18).

The Earnest Money Agreement,

consistent with the Plaintiff's listing agreement, did not include
the Plaintiff's accounts receivable or payable in the terms of the
sale (Ex. 15, 18).
ANDERSON'S REPRESENTATIONS
On the evening of July 18 or the following day Anderson told
the Plaintiff that the buyers were worth seven and one-half million
dollars.

When the buyers, through Anderson, asked the Plaintiff for

a financial statement, the Plaintiff in turn asked Anderson to check
into the buyers' financial standing.

Anderson agreed to and reported

back that the buyers were worth 3t million net worth (Tr. 154-155,
278-279, 282).

Anderson at first denied that he had been told by

the buyers that they were worth millions of dollars (Tr. 67).

He

later admitted that he may have told the Plaintiff that they were
worth seven million dollars (Tr. 68) and also admitted that "millions"
had come up in his presence (Tr. 73-74).

Although Anderson denied

that he represented to the Plaintiff that the buyers were financially
sound (Tr. 68), a local bank manager testifie? that Anderson had
told him that the buyers were sound (Tr. 289, 396) .

Anderson admitted

that he never made any inquiry into the buyers' financial standing
(Tr. 105, 109-110, 125).
-9- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Following July 18, 1978 the Plaintiff continued to meet
with Anderson on an almost daily basis (Tr. 151, 158).

The Plain-

tiff, as with the sales of his motel and home, again told Anderson
that he expected to receive the $5,000.00 earnest money and Anderson
said that he would get it for him (Tr. 149-151, ~265-266).
AUGUST 14, 1978 CLOSING
On August 14, 1978 Anderson contacted the Plaintiff and told
him that all of the arrangements for the funding of the purchase of
his company ahd been worked out, including the $50,000.00 operating
capital.

He asked the Plaintiff to come to his office to finish

preparing the paperwork necessary for closing the sale (Tr. 161).
At 3:00 p.m. the Plaintiff met at the United Farm Agency
office with Anderson, Anderson's wife and secretary, Martha, McGarry
and Gleason.

The parties figured adjustments and prepared a rough

draft of a closing statement.

The closing statement included the

$200,000.00 sales price, the $20,000.00 commission, and the down
payment of $40,000.00, among the other items . . Adjustments were
made to reflect changes in the Plaintiff's inventory since his
business was listed.

The Plaintiff's receivables and payables were

at this point included in the sale and offset against each other.
After the receivables, payables, and other adjustments had been
taken into account, the Plaintiff was entitled to his $40,000.00
cash down and to an additional $44,000.00 note (rather than the
$38,750.00 listed in the earnest money agreement (Tr. 163), making
an agreed equity in the company of $84,000.00 (Tr. 161-162, 197-198,
305-313).
The adjustments having been made, Anderson prepared two
promissory notes to be signed by the Plaintiff, one for $44,000.00,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and one for $35,000.00 (Tr.

81~31,

85-86).

Anderson also prepared

several warranty deeds for the Plaintiff's signature (Tr. 83-84, 90,
93-95).

He helped prepare a bill of sale for the Plaintiff's equip-

ment (Tr. 163-164, 237) and he had previously ordered preliminary
title reports on the Plaintiff's land which were kept in the United
Farm Agency file (Tr. 416-417; Ex. 20-29).
WORTHLESS NOTES GIVEN
The warranty deed and the bill of sale were signed by the
Plaintiff and the warranty deeds were notorized by Anderson.

The

note for $44,000.00, payable over five years, was signed by James
C. McGarry as president of JCM Development Company, notorized by
Anderson and given to the Plaintiff.

About an hour later

brought the note for $35,000.00 to the Plaintiff.

Ander~on

This note repre-

sented $35,000.00 of the $40,000.00 cash down which was to be paid
to the Plaintiff at closing.

The Plaintiff expressed concern why he

was receiving a note instead of cash as agreed and the parties told
him that the money had not yet been wired and requested that he
wait for this amount and that they would give him the balance of
$5,000.00 from the earnest money.

Anderson assured the Plaintiff

that his procedure would be safe and encouraged him to accept the
notes.

When the Plaintiff asked Anderson about the need for colla-

teral for the notes, Anderson laughed and told the Plaintiff that
the notes were "as good as gold" and he would have no problem getting
paid (Tr. 88, 162-165, 282).
Relying upon Anderson, the Plaintiff accepted two worthless
unsecured notes totaling $79,000.00.

The Plaintiff surrendered

$200,00.00 in assets to JCM on an oral promise that JCM would pay
off his opligations.

He turned his checking account and in excess

of $60.000.00 accounts receivable over to McGarry, assured by
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Anderson that McGarry would use them to pay debts and keep the
company running (Tr. 171-172, 306).

When the Plaintiff received

the $5,000.00 "earnest money" it was actually $5,000.00 of his own
receivables (Tr. 171).

Despite admitting that the Plaintiff had

been a good customer, Anderson testified that

h~

was not concerned

about the Plaintiff's welfare on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 118).
LAWYER NOT USED
The following morning of August 15, 1978, the Plaintiff asked
Anderson for a finished closing statement, but never got a satisfactory response (Tr. 96, 170-171).

On the closings of the Plain-

tiff's motel and home, Anderson had gotten the parties together,
roughed out the closing

docume~ts,

and then, pursuant to United Farm

Agency policy, had taken the Plaintiff and the buyers to an attorney
who finalized the closing.

The Plaintiff had expected this to occur

again and, therefore, kept asking, without success, for the closing
statement (Tr. 96, 122, 257-264, 284).

Anderson did most of the

negotiating for the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff at all times believed
that Anderson and United Farm Agency were representing him (T. 144,
252-255, 264-266, 284).
PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED OF HIS ASSETS
OnceMcGarry and Gleason had the Plaintiff's assets, the sale
of the Plaintiff's business came to a devastating conclusion.
McGarry and Gleason immediately skimmed off the Plaintiff's accounts
receivable and failed to apply them to the operation of the business.
Unsecured assets were sold or hauled off.
possessed or foreclosed upon by creditors.
and employees were not paid.

Secured assets were reThe company's creditors

All of the deals involving McGarry

and Gleason fell through (Tr. 75, 113-114, 117).
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The Plaintiff went to the county attorney, the attorney general, and private attorneys for help, but received no help.
his

own

He did

investigation which revealed that the supposedly wealthy

Mr. McGarry had a tiny office above a little store in Salt Lake
City, and that J. G. Realty's
office building.

business address was a bathroom inan

When he tried to regain his business records a

gun was pointed in his face and his life threatened.

A year Jater,

after the commencement of this action, he was compelled to file
bankruptcy (Tr. 176-191, 203, 212, 221).
JUDGMENT
The trial court granted the Plaintiff judgment against McGarry,
Gleason and JCM Development Company for fraud.

The court entered

judgment against Anderson, Clan Stilson (the United Farm Agency
broker), and United Farm Agency for the reasons set forth in the
court's ruling at pages 413 to 418 of the transcript, and as set forth
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered (R. 232-239).
The court found that fiduciary and other legal duties were
owed the Plaintiff by Anderson, Stilson and United Farm Agency as a
result of their prior dealings, their signed listing agreements and
Utah law (R. 233; Finding No. 9).

The court further ruled that the

duties were not terminated by the parties since they never told the
Plaintiff that they were no longer representing him and, furthermore,
continued to do so.

The court found that the Plaintiff justifiably,

and without fault of his own, relied on the parties to protect his
interests and was entitled to rely on Anderson's representations
(R. 236; Finding No. 25).

Specifically, the court found that the

following duties were owed to the Plaintiff and were breached by
Anderson, Stilson and United Farm Agency:
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1.

The duty to deal in honesty, good faith,

loyalty and

with due competence (R. 236; Finding No. 26).
2.

The duty to investigate the financial stability of JCM
(R. 237; Finding No. 26).

3.

The duty to utilize the services of·an attorney to conduct the Plaintiff's closing (R. 237; Finding No. 27).

4.

The duty to prevent the Plaintiff from accepting unsecured
notes and from partingwith his assets without proper collateral being provided to assure payment (R. 237; Finding
No. 28.)

5.

The duty to investigate into J. G. Realty's background
(R. 237; Finding No. 29).

The court found that the Plaintiff had suffered damages in
the amount of $185,178.30 and awarded judgment, jointly and severally, against all parties named except Linda McGarry, for said
amount.

Neither Anderson, McGarry, Gleason, nor JCM has appealed.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST UNITED FARM
AGENCY IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Robert Anderson had been United Farm Agency's agent since
1974 and had handled about 20 closings per year for United Farm
Agency by the time he undertook to sell the Plaintiff's business in
1978 (Tr. 121, 125).
United Farm Agency's responsiblity as Anderson's principal
is set forth in 3 Am Jur 2nd Agency § 267:
The well-settled general rule is that a
principal is liable civilly for the tortious
acts of his agent which are done within the
course and scope of the agent's employment.
However, this rule is not grounded on agency
principles, which is evident from the holdSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ings that a principal may be held for his agent's
tort committed in the course and scope of the
agent's employment even though the principal does
not authorize, ratify, participate in, or know of,
such misconduct, or even if he forbade or disapproved of the act complained of.
Fundamentally, and according to both the Restatement and the American courts, there is no
distinction to be drawn between the liability of
a principal for the tortious act of his agent and
the liability of a master for the tortious act of
his servant.
In both cases, the tort liability
is based on the master and servant, rather than
agency, principal; the liability for the tortious
act of the employee is grounded upon the maxim of
"respondeat superior" and is to be determined by
considering, from a factual standpoint, the question whether the tortious act was done while the
employee, whether agent or.servant, was acting
within the scope of his employment. (Emphasis added.)
United Farm Agency, in addition to being Anderson's principal,
was also the Plaintiff's agent.
was the Plaintiff's subagent.

Under such circumstance, Anderson
The Restatement of Agency, Second

§ 406 states:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is responsible
to the principal for the conduct of ,a subservant
or other subagent with reference to the principal' s affairs entrusted to the subagent, as the
agent is for his own conduct; and as to other
matters, as a principal is for the conduct of a.
servant or other agent.
Comment·b. of § 406 states:
An agent who employs a subagent is the latter's
principal and is responsible .
. to his principal for the subagent's derelictious.
Thus, the
agent is subject to liability to the principal
for harm to the principal's property or business
caused by the subagent's negligence or other
wrong to the principal's interest ... 3

3 Two of the illustrations of § 406 concern real estate agents:
1.
P employes A, a real estate agent, to sell Blackacre for
him.
A entrusts the transaction to B, one of his employees.
Without A's knowledge, B misprepresents to T, a prospective purchaser,
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The facts herein clearly show that Anderson was acting within the scope of his employment as agent for United Farm Agency
when he listed, advertised,. found a buyer for· and caused the loss
of the Plaintiff's property, that Anderson, as subagent, was entrusted to handle the sale of the Plaintiff's business, and that
Anderson caused the Plaintiff's loss while acting under his entrusted authority.

The facts further show that United Farm Agency itself

was involved in the sale and not just Anderson.
Contrary to the Defendant's argument, the issue herein invalved does not begin with Anderson's deplorable (mis)representation
of the Plaintiff in July and August of 1978.

The issue commences

with the United Farm Agency listing agreement which was signed each
time the Plaintiff listed his motel, his office building, his home,
and his business.

The same listing agreement form was signed by

Robert Anderson as a United Farm Agency local representative on
each property listed (Ex. 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15).

The form had no place

for the United Farm Agency broker, Clan Stilson, to sign.
it said, "IMPORTANT TO OUR LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE:

Instead,

Be sure this

agreement is filled out as fully as possible ... ", clearly showing
that Mr. Stilson's signature as broker was not required by company
policy and that Anderson was authortized and entrusted to act for
the company on his own.

Most significantly, the form contained the

the condition of the premises, and for this misrepresentation P is
subject to liability to T. A is subject to liability to P for the
loss to P caused by B's conduct.
2.
Same facts as in Illustration 1, except that Bis bribed
by T to sell Blackacre at a low price. A is subject to liability
to P for the loss P thereby caused, but not for the amount of the
bribe received by B unless it comes to A's hands.
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printed signature of Norman McCain, president of United Farm
Agency.

Under Utah law a corporation that engages in the sale of

real estate for a fee is a "real estate broker".

Utah Code Anno-

tated, 1953, as amended, §61-2-2; Diversified General Corporation
v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., Utah, 584 P.2d 848 (1978).

There-

fore, the listing agreement form was signed by United Farm Agency
as a broker.
The United Farm listing agreement form, signed each time by
the parties, contained "A Personal Message From Our President",
which included such assurances as:
with the sale of your property.

"Thank you for entrusting us

We will do our best to warrant

your faith", and, "We will do our best to serve you".
The Plaintiff signed this United Farm Agency form when he
listed his motel and office building (Ex. 2, 3; Tr. 9-11).

The

motel and office building were advertised and sold through United
Farm Agency's national catalogue and by use of financing provided
by United Farm Agency's subsidiary, RLC.

Anderson and United Farm

Agency split a $20,000.00 commission which was paid by the Plaintiff.

United Farm Agency never disputed that Anderson was its

agent and acting for it when the Plaintiff's motel and office
building were listed, advertised and sold (Tr.

19~23).

On January 28, 1978, the Plaintiff listed his home and construction business together.

The business and home were also

listed separately but on the same United Farm Agency form each time
(Ex. 5, 6; Tr. 13-16).

The home was advertised and sold through

United Farm Agency's national catalogue and United Farm Agency and
- Anderson split a $4,500.00 commission (Tr. 24-25).

Again, United

Farm Agency did not dispute that Anderson was acting as its agent.
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The construction business was also advertised in United
Farm Agencys'inational catalogue, clearly proving that United Farm
Agency approved of Anderson's undertaking on its behalf to sell
the property (Tr. 16-17).

Anderson delivered JCM to the Plaintiff

as a prospectj_ve buyer, fully expecting a commission on July 17,
1978, a date within two months of the dates that both the motel
and home closings had occurred (Tr. 36-41).

At trial Anderson,

Stilson and United Farm Agency contended that they ceased to represent the Plaintiff after Anderson, out of the presence of the Plaintiff, agreed to let Gleason handle the sale.

However, neither

Anderson, nor United Farm Agency, nor Stilson, nor anyone else,
ever told the Plaintiff that he was no longer being represented by
them or that no commission was to be received by United Farm Agency
(Tr. 53-54, 107, 414).

To the contrary, Anderson told the Plain-

tiff that he was to receive a commission, and a $20,000.00 commission
appeared on the closing statement prepared on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 44,
51, 126, 145-146, 161, 198).

Anderson also prepared closing docu-

ments ,including deeds and notes (Tr. 80-94; Ex. 20-29).
Despite the foregoing facts, United Farm Agency contends that
it had no responsiblity for the Plaintiff's loss and relies upon
Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P2d 32 (1965) to support
its position.

However, Wilkerson can be readily distinguished.

In Wilkerson, the wronged Plaintiff had dealt solely with a real
estate agent and did not even know that the agent had a broker
until afer he had instituted suit.
documents with the broker's name
liance on the broker;

The court found that:
were used;

wa~

no

no re-

(3) the broker did not anticipate receiving

a commission; and ( 4) the broker simply
sale.

(2) there

(1)

did

not participate in the
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clusion on each point.
(1)

In the Plaintiff's case, United Farm Agency documents

were used to list the Plaintiff's construction business, or parts
thereof, three times (Ex. 6, 14, 15).

While United Farm Agency's

forms were not used for the earnest money agreement-,

it was

because, as is customary between participating brokers, a commission split had been arranged between United Farm Agency and J. G.
Realty and because Gleason persuaded Anderson to let him handle the
sale in return for millions in sales that United Farm would handle
down the road ·(Tr. 44-48, 69, 145-146).
(2)

The court specifically found that the Plaintiff relied

on United Farm and had the right to do so by virtue of the terms
of the listing agreement, United Farm Agency's duties under Utah
real estate law, and United Farm Agency's fiduciary duties arising
from the agent-principal relationship (R. 233; Finding No. 9;.Tr. 414).
The listing agreement contained a warranty that United Farm Agency
would act in good faith and do its best to serve the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff testified that his was a United Farm Agency deal and
that he was relying on both Anderson and United Farm Agency:

Q:

(By Mr. Snow)

Now, you indicated here that you expected

me to close this transaction; did you not?

A:

I did.

Q:

Well, now, when did you come and talk to me about this
transaction?

A:

I didn't.

Q:

You didn't.

Well, if you never talked to me about it, why

would you have expected to have it closed in my office?
A:

Because all of United Farm's deals were being handled
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through you and this was a United Farm deal and I expected
to go to your office and close.
Q:

But his was not a United Farm deal, this was a J. G. Realty
deal?

MR. MORTENSEN:
question.
THE COURT:

Objection, your Honor.

He's just arguing with the witness.

Objection sustained.

you say this is not, you see.
Q:

He's not asking a

(By Mr. Snow)

All right.

That's not a question, when
That's argumentative.

Well, now, when you asked Mr.

Anderson -- you said you asked him on this $5000, and that
would have been on the 19th?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Why didn't you ask J. G. Realty for It, Gleason?

A:

They weren't representing me.

Bob Anderson was my repre-

sentative.
Q:

Well, why did you do it with that other realty company then?

A:

I didn't.

Q:

Oh, you didn't?

A:

No.

I was making an earnest money agreement with the par-

ties in the office, Mr. Anderson and McGarry and myself.
And when Mr. Gleason made this statement:

"Shall we use

your form or my form,'' it didn't make any difference who
was handling the deal.
Farm.

I was still working through United

(Tr. 264-265)

(Emphasis added.)
(3)

In, this case, United Farm Agency clearly anticipated re-

ceiving a commission.
listing agreement form.

The property was listed several times on its
United Farm Agency advertised the property
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for sale in its national catalogue and Anderson introduced JCM,
expecting to receive a commission.

The $20,000.00, ten percent,

commission appeared on the closing statement prepared by the parties on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 161).

Only United Farm Agency was en-

titled to the commission since only United Farm Agency had a listing agreement with the Plaintiff and no commission was included on
the J. G. Realty Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 18, line 49).

The

reason that Anderson never told the Plaintiff ·he was no longer
representing him was that he continued to represent the Plaintiff
and continued to expect a commission to and beyond August 14, 1978.
(4)

United Farm Agency not only participated in the sale of

the Plaintiff's business as shown above, but United Farm Agency also
participated in the purchase of the Plaintiff's business as well.
United Farm Agency and McGarry intended to use the Plaintiff's construction business to develop a mobile home park in which each was
to benefit financially.
United Farm Agency and Anderson, by an Earnest Money Agreement dated July 18, 1978, agreed to sell to JCM 20 acres of land
located south of Moab for $100,000.00.

The land had been taken by

United Farm Agency and Anderson as a commission from a prior sale and
each owned an undivided one-half of the property.

The 20 acres

and surrounding property to be purchased by JCM were to be developened into a mobile home subdivision with United Farm Agency to have
the exclusive right to sell over two million dollars in lots for
a ten percent commission on sales made (or a potential $200,000.00).
United Farm Agency was also to provide financing for the purchase
of the lots.

At trial United Farm Agency did not disclaim know-

ledge of this and could not because a public announcement of its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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deal with JCM had appeared in the Moab Times-Independent newspaper
(Tr. 60-69).
Immediately after the Plaintiff turned his company over to
the crooks the newspaper article had appeared announcing that United
Farm Agency would sell and finance the lots at

$12,~00.00

each and

that Phillips Construction Company, recently purchased by JCM,
would be the contractor (T. 64-66, 110).

The whole United Farm

Agency-JCM deal had hinged upon the purchase by JCM of the Plaintiff's business and this dramatic conflict of interest on the part
of United Farm Agency directly contributed to the Plaintiff's loss.
To this point it has been shown that Anderson was clearly
acting as agent for United Farm Agency when he caused the Plaintiff's
loss and that United Farm Agency clearly was itself participating
in the sale and loss of the Plaintiff's business.

Despite such

clear evidence that United Farm Agency knew or should have known
that Anderson was mishandling the Plaintiff's sale (see Wells v.
Walker Bank and Trust Co., Utah, 590 P2d 1261 (1979),

United Farm

Agency, for the first time on appeal, attempts to feign ignorance
of Anderson's actions on its behalf.

However, in so doing United

Farm Agency proves that it is culpable even if it did' not know
what Anderson was doing.

At page 16 of its brief United Farm

Ag~ncy

states:
In fact, aside from setting out its policies
and procedures as to how a proper transaction
should be handled for United Farm Agency, there
was no supervision at all of Anderson's activities and conduct."
(Emphasis added.)
\

This incredible admission establishes in and of itself United Farm
Agency's and Clan Stilson's liability for the Plaintiff's loss.
Such failure to supervise is

p~r

se negligence on the part of United
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Farm Agency and Stilson as brokers under Utah law and as such is
cause for revocation of their right to sell real estate pursuant
to Section 61-2-11(14) of the Utah Code Annotated, which states
that a broker's license may be suspended or revoked for "failing
to exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of his
licensees."
The record overwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding
that United Farm Agency and Clan Stilson are liable for the Plaintiff's loss.

Anderson was their agent and acted in his entrusted

capacity as agent at all times.

United Farm Agency itself under-

took to represent the Plaintiff when it accepted Anderson's listing of the Plaintiff's business and advertised the Plaintiff's
business in its national catalogue.

United Farm Agency, as a real

estate broker, owed the Plaintiff the obligation to deal with the
Plaintiff with high standards of "honesty, integrity,
reputation, and competancy".

truthfulnes~,

Dugan v. Jones, Utah, 615 P2d 1239

<1980); Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §61-2-6(a).

The

record is replete with proof that those standards were not met.
The only dispute in the record is whether United Farm Agency unilaterally abandoned the Plaintiff without advising him that he was
on his. own 4 , or whether United Farm Agency, through Anderson, continued to represent the Plaintiff through the time he was defrauded.

4 rn relation to United Farm Agency's claimed unilateral
abandonment of the Plaintiff, the Court is referred to Disciplinary
Rule 2-110 ( 2), which states that a lawyer shall not withdraw from
employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due
notice to his client. A real estate broker should have no less a
duty. Dugan v. Jones, supra.
ei
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Either way, United Farm breached its contractual, professional,
fiduciary, and codified duties to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff
as a result was defrauded of his business.
POINT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER PAID FOR OVE'I1
$185,000.00 IN ASSETS BECAUSE OF UNITED
FARM AGENCY'S NEGLIGENCE AND BREACHES OF
DUTIES
A broker is liable to his principal for all damages which
flow naturally from his misconduct and which are a direct consequence thereof.

12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §96.

The uncontroverted

evidence shows that the Plaintiff lost over $260,000.00 in
as a result of the misconduct of United Farm.

assets~

The uncontroverted

evidence further shows that he was never paid for over $185,000.00
worth of assets (R. 236; Findings No. 22-25).
It must be understood that

the Plaintiff's company con-

tained over $200,000.00 in assets exclusive of the Plaintiff's
accounts receivable.

The construction company, as listed for sale,

included only a shop and office building (with storage rental units),
all equipment for building construction, franchise, and equipment
for metal buildings (Ex. 5, 6, 8, 15; Tr. 13-15, 28).

The Plain-

tiff's accounts receivable were not included in the listings and
and were not included in the assets listed in the Earnest Money
Agreement of July 18, 1978 which contained the $200,000.00 sales
price (Ex. 18).
The Plaintiff testified that
ment and inventory was sold to JCM.

aboti~

$125,000.00 in equip-

Defendant's Exhibit 45 is a

partial inventory and was ref erred to as a partial inventory in
the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 18; Tr. 299-301).

That partial
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inventory listed over $92,000.00 in assets which were sold.

In

addition to the items on the inventory, the Plaintiff also sold a
950 cat loader valued at about $15,000.00 and metal buildings
valued at over $30,000.00 (Tr. 226-227, 301).
shop building and an additional lot.
been listed at $70,000.00 (Ex. 14).

He also sold his

The shop building alone had
The combined value of these

assets, therefore, equalled, if not exceeded, $200,000.00 before
the Plaintiff's accounts receivable came to be included in the
sale on· August 14, 1978.

At, or before, the closing, the Defen-

dants persuaded the Plaintiff to include his accounts receivable
of about $62,000 into the sale.

These were to be "offset" by JCM

agreeing to pay over $30,000.00 in accounts payable owed by the
Plaintiff and by JCM agreeing to pay off loans to which certain of
the accounts receivable had been pledged (Tr. 305-306, 312, 314315).

The effect of this "offset" was to include over $60,000.00

additional assets into the sale but to leave the purchase price at
$200,000.00 on paper.
At trial the Plaintiff did not try to recover the full
$260,000.00 -plus value of his

lost assets since some debts

had been paid (a small portion by JCM; a larger portion by proceeds from foreclosure sales) (Tr. 206, 210-211).

The Plaintiff

instead offered proof to show how much of that value had not been
paid.

His uncontroverted testimony showed that he had not been

paid any part of the $79,000.00 equity represented by the two notes
($44,000.00 and $35,000.00 respectively).

His uncontroverted tes-

timony further proved that obligations totaling over $106,000.00
were not paid by JCM as agreed (R. 236, Findings No. 22-25; Tr.
197-235, 317).
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Therefore, the Plaintiff was defrauded of over $185,000.00
in assets for which he was never paid.

The unpaid debts and

worthless notes are the measure of the Plaintiff's loss of assets.
Points II and III of United Farm Agency's brief do not allege that
the Plaintiff was not defrauded or that JCM was not to have paid
the debts testified to by the Plaintiff.

United Farm Agency's

contentions regarding the Statute of Frauds and capacity to sue
are red herrings

which

detract from the fact that the Plaintiff

was tjefrauded because of United Farm Agency's negligence and
breaches of fiduciary duties.

All of United Farm Agency's conten-

tions are smokescreens to hide the fact that it was negligent when
it encouraged the Plaintiff to part with over $260,000.00 in assets
without receiving collateral, a written assumption agreement, a
closing statement and other necessary legal protection.

Morely v.

J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976).
POINT II(A)
THE PLAINTIFF HAD CAPACITY TO SUE BECAUSE HE
OWNED THE ASSETS OF WHICH HE WAS DEFRAUDED AND
WAS PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE DEBTS WHICH WERE
ASSUMED BUT NOT PAID. ALSO, THE LAW DOES NOT
REQUIRE THAT THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY BE SUBSTITUTED AS THE PLAINTIFF IN A PENDING ACTION.
The evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiff had capacity
to sue for his damages.

It was the Plaintiff who was wronged, not

the corporation.
First, all assets sold to JCM were owned by the Plaintiff
personally (Tr. 218; Ex. 20, 21, 26, 28, 29).
Second, the obligations which were to be paid by JCM were the
personal primary obligations of the Plaintiff and not obligations
of the corporation.

The Plaintiff did business personally as
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Phillips

Construction Company at all times.

He had in early 1978,

upon the advice of an attorney, formed a corporation which was
called Phillips Construction Company, Inc.

The attorney's plan

called for the Plaintiff to maintain ownership of all equipment
and property and to lease them to the corporation (Tr. 132, 207).
Business was intended to be carried on through the corporation,
however, the corporation ''had just been formed and was not fully
going" and no assets were ever conveyed to the corporation (Tr. 218).
The Plaintiff testified that no obligations were ever incurred
through the corporation's name but that all were incurred in the
Plaintiff's name personally:
THE COURT:

Mr. Mortensen, I thought he testified he did
business in the name of the corporation, but
he owned all the property and equipment and
stuff was in his name personally.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That was the intent.
All right.

You have a bill to somebody like

Riverside Accoustics.

Now, was that to order

material doing business as?
THE WITNESS:

I did not order these materials as Phillips
Construction Company, Inc.

I ordered all

material as Phillips Construction Company,
Rodney L. Phillips, doing business as
Phillips Construction Company.

The people

are not going to supply a corporation unless
credit is established for that corporation.
And all the accounts that I had prior to the
sale of this business, all those accounts
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were continuting accounts over the past years
of doing business as Rodney L. Phillips doing
business as Phillips Construction Company.
THE COURT:

All right.

Go ahead.

(Tr. 219).

The Plaintiff testified that each obligation was his and the court
accepted his testimony as true (Tr. 197-235).

Exhibits 34, 36, 38,

39 and 40 all show that obligations, including taxes, were incurred

personally by the Plaintiff doing business as Phillips Construction
Company.

A bank manager's testimony confirmed the same (Tr. 394).

The inclusion of the corporation stock in the sale was a
clean up matter and purely incidental to the main sale.

The pro-

vision for the sale of 100% of the stock in Phillips Construction
Company was added to the Earnest Money Agreement and initialled by
the Plaintiff as an afterthought (see line 7 of Exhibit 18).

Both

Anderson and the Plaintiff testifed that a stock transfer would
not properly transfer the Plaintiff's assets (Tr. 43, 170-171).
No conflicting evidence or testimony was ever offered by any Defendant to show that any of the obligations were corporation rather
than personal debt, or that any of the assets belonged to the corporation rather than to the Plaintiff.
While United Farm Agency alleges that there is no evidence
that the Plaintiff has suffered as a result of JCM's failure to
pay the obligations and, therefore, the Plaintiff has no cause of
action;

the evidence, from start to finish, says otherwise (Tr. 197-

234; Ex.

34, 36, 38, 29, 40).

The Plaintiff testified repeatedly

at trial (three years after the July 1978 sale) that the obligations
had never been paid and that he was being held responsible by his
creditors.

Perhaps the most succinct statement occurred during the
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Plaintiff's testimony at this point:
Q.

(By Mr. Mortensen)

For the record, Mr. Phillips,

on any of the matters we're going to be bringing before
the Court, have you made any payments towards satisfying
them?
A.

No.

Because of my transactions with Bob Anderson,

I was forced into bankruptcy and I haven't had any -- a
penny to pay any of it (Tr. 212).
Third, although the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy, no rule of
law required that the trustee in bankruptcy be substituted as the
Plaintiff in the action.

Bankruptcy

Rule 610, states:

The trustee or receiver may, with or without court
approval, prosecute or enter his appearance and defend
any pending action or proceeding by or against the
bankrupt, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate, before any tribunal.
(Emphasis added.)
Rule 610 clearly states that a trustee's appearance is discretionary
in a pending action which was instituted prior to the bankruptcy
petition being filed.

Without trustee intervention the debtor can

continue the litigation and, if successful, the fruits of the
litigation will inure to the benefit of the trustee.
in turn is bound by any judgment rendered.

The trustee

See 9 Am Jur 2d,

Bankruptcy, §157 and authorites cited therein.
Further, this issue is raised as a defense for the first time
on appeal.

The Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's bankruptcy prior

to trial and never raised the issue even though it was brought to
the court's attention during the pretrial conference held on
August 4, 1980. 5

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a)(l) states that

5

A transcript of the pretrial conference is to be filed pursuantSponsored
to order
of this Court dated May 17, 1982.
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if a defendant desires to raise the issue of capacity he must do so
by a specific negative averment.

The Defendants never alleged a

lack of capacity and thereby waived the defense, assuming, arguendo,
that lack of capacity could be a defense in this matter.
Finally, even if this Court should conclude that the trustee
is a necessary party plaintiff, the proper way to remedy the matter
is not by a reversal, but by a simple order.joining the trustee as
a plaintiff pursuant to URCP 21, which states in applicable part:
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added
by order of the court on motion of any party or its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just.
(Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to Rule 21, parties may be added even after trial has
been completed~ Harris-Dudley Plumbi~g Company v~ Professional United
World :Travel Association (WTA), ·Inc:, Utah, 529 P2d 586 ( 1979). 6 This
Court may rest assured that the Plaintiff's trustee in bankruptcy
has known of this action and that he is willing upon request
be joined as a party plaintiff.

Up to the point of appeal the De-

fendants simply did not request the trustee's joinder despite the
Plaintiff's offer to do so at the pretrial.
POINT II(B)
THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS rs UNAVAILABLE TO UNITED FARM AGENCY BECAUSE NO AFFIRMATIVE
PLEADING OR OBJECTION RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND FURTHER BECAUSE THE DEFENSE COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO UNITED FARM AGENCY
IN ANY EVENT.
The affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds is raised

6 This Court in this very action has approved the post trial
addition of a party defendant.
The March 1, 1982 ruling denied a
motion by the party added to quash Rule 71B service. See also Shirley
v. Venaglia, 86 N.M. 721, 527 P2d 316 (1974); Smith v. Castlemen,
81, N.M. 1, 462 P2d 135 (1969).
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for the first time on appeal.

As conceded by United Farm Agency in

its brief, the defense was never plead.

Since the

~efense

was not

plead it was waived under Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
P2d 898 (1976).
at trial.

Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., Utah, 548
Additionally, the Statute of Frauds was not raised

Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that no ver-

dict or finding shall be set aside, nor decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there
is a timely objection which sets forth the specific ground of objection and the matter is ruled upon by the Court.

No objection relat-

ing to the Statute of Frauds was ever voiced by the Defendants and
ruled on by the trial court.

Therefore, the Statute of Frauds cannot

now be raised to attack the evidence received by the trial court.
Despite the foregoing, United Farm Agency now claims that it
didn't need to plead the Statute of Frauds because the Plaintiff
did not plead special damages.

The answer to this is that, assuming

that the Plaintiff's damages constituted special damages (which
they did not), the Defendants should have objected if they were surprised.

They did not object because they were not surprised.

They

were not surprised because they were forwarned that the Plaintiff
was going to measure his loss of assets by the amount he had not
been paid for them by JCM as agreed.

They were forewarned by

Point V (pages 12-13) of the Plaintiff's pretrial Memorandum dated
July 9, 1981, that the Plaintiff was going to so contend (R.159-161).
In that memorandum the Plaintiff clearly stated that he was entitled
to the value of his unpaid notes plus the balance owed on all unpaid obligations.
The Plaintiff testified that he had not been paid any amount
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toward his notes totalling $79,000.00.

He testified that JCM was
)

to have paid off over $106,000.00 in debt as part of the purchase
price, but failed to do so.

He testified that Robert Anderson was

present and participated in the closing on August 14, 1978.

Ander-

son did not dispute that he was present, nor did he dispute that
any of the obligations cited by the Plaintiff were to be paid byJCM
.

(Tr. 254, 317).

-7

No witness for United Farm Agency claimed that the

Plaintiff had received any payments on his notes nor that the Plaintiff's obligations had been paid.

Therefore, the court was abso-

lutely justified in finding that the Plaintiff had been damaged in
the amount of $186,000.00, the

~mount

he had not been paid for assets

of which he· was defrauded.
Because the Plaintiff's testimony regarding unpaid debt went
to establish the value of his assets for which he had not been paid,
the Statute of Frauds is irrelevant.

The Plaintiff did not seek to

enforce an agreement whereby United Farm Agency had promised to
answer for his debt.

The Plaintiff sought to recover damages re-

sulting from United Farm Agency's failure to discharge its duties
to him as found by the trial court.

12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §96.

In Points II and III of its brief, United Farm Agency incredibly seeks to use its own negligence to prevent the Plaintiff from
recovering his damages.

Both points emphasize that the Plaintiff

did not receive a final written contract which obligated JCM to pay

7

The fact that the Plaintiff's payables became part of the
sale despite not being part of the Earnest Money Agreement is not
remarkable. As has been shown, the parties clearly departed from
the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement at the closing.
The
Plaintiff's receivables, as well as the payables, were included in
the sale.
The Plaintiff received a note for $44,000.00 instead of a
note for $38,750.00.
The Plaintiff received a note for $35,000.00
and $5,000.00 cash instead of the $40,000.00 cash down.
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off his debts.

Both points ignore the trial court's findings that

the failure of the Plaintiff to have a proper and legal closing
was the fault of United Farm Agency, since by United Farm Agency
policy a lawyer should have been used to close the matter (Tr. 122,
415; R. 236; Finding 27).
United Farm Agency cannot be allowed to escape liability because of its own negligence.

The evidence clearly shows that in

July, 1981, three years after the sale, the Plaintiff still had not
been paid the value of his notes and his creditors had still not
been paid, forcing the Plaintiff into bankruptcy.

Before the Plain-

tiff listed his business with United Farm Agency, the Plaintiff had
over $260,000.00 in assets and around $175,000.00 in liabilities.
After the Plaintiff listed his business with United Farm Agency he
had no assets, $106,000.00 in liabilities, and two worthless notes.
POINT III
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT ANDERSON FOR
BREACHES OF DUTIES OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF.
Robert Anderson has not appealed from the judgment and findings of the trial court.

However, United Farm Agency, neverthe-

less, contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the
court's findings and judgment against Anderson.
The court found that at least five duties were owed to the
Plaintiff and breached by Anderson (R. 236-237; Findings No. 25-29).
First, the court found that by abandoning the Plaintiff without
advising

him that he was on his own, Anderson breached his duties·

of good faith,

loyalty and due competence, and that the Plaintiff

was justified in relying on Anderson since he had never been told
that he should not do so.

Anderson admitted that he never told
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the Plaintiff he was not going to represent him (Tr. 107).

On

August 14, 1978, Anderson never expressed any concern about the
manner of the closing although he knew things weren't being done
as they should (Tr. 118).

He prepared and notarized notes and

deeds at the closing and allowed the Plaintiff to take unsecured
notes and otherwise part with his assets without receiving· collateral (Tr. 81-88).

Anderson testified that although the Plaintiff

had been a good customer in the past, he was not concerned about
his welfare because, "I wasn',t involved" (Tr. 118).
While Anderson claimed to have expressed concern to the
Plaintiff on July 18, 1978, about how the sale was to be handled,
the Plaintiff denied that any concern was ever expressed in his
presence, and Anderson admitted that the Plaintiff may not have been
.present when he told Gleason that the sale should not be handled
as a stock transfer (Tr. 47, 256).

Anderson also admitted that he

never told the Plaintiff that he had done wrong in entering into
the Earnest Money Agreement (Tr. 53).

He testified that he washed

his hands of the Plaintiff because Gleason had promised him millions
of dollars in future sales (Tr. 48, 69).
The listing agreement did reserve the Plaintiff's right to
sell the business himself (Ex. 15).

However, the Plaintiff had

also reserved the right to sell his office building himself (Ex. 3).
Anderson found a buyer for the office building and the motel and
received one-half of United Farm Agency's $20,000.00 commission.
Neither Anderson nor United Farm Agency at that time claimed that
the Plaintiff had sold the office building and motel himself.

It

was Anderson who introduced McGarry and Gleason to the Plaintiff on
July 17, 1978.

The Plaintiff testified that after July 18, 1978

Sponsored
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an almost daily basis and that he believed that the sale of his
business was going to be handled like his other sales had been by
Anderson and United Farm Agency (Tr. 151, 158, 165).

He was told

that there was to be a commission split between United Farm Agency and

J. G. Realty, anda commission appeared on the draft of the closing
statement (Tr. 44, 145-146, 161).
Anderson omitted to advise the Plaintiff of other important
facts.

Anderson admitted that he never told the Plaintiff about

his $25,000.00 note which was in default and which was secured by
the 20 acres which Anderson and United Farm Agency were selling
to JCM (Tr. 117).

8

When he was informed at or near the end of

August, 1978, that there

were

"flags sticking up" on the deal,

Anderson also omitted to advise the Plaintiff that problems were
developing regarding his sale (Tr. 100-102, 116).
The foregoing conduct by Anderson can only be described as
being in bad faith, dishonest, disloyal and incompetent.

Additional

improper conduct by Anderson will be discussed in relation to the
court's other findings.
In Finding No. 27 the court found that Anderson had a duty to
assure that a legally proper closing occur and that in not utilizing
the services of an attorney, Anderson breached said duty.

Anderson

testified that United Farm Agency policy required that he use an
attorney to close his sales (Tr. 122).

On prior sales Anderson had

prepared closing documents and then had taken the Plaintiff to an
attorney who finished the closings.

The Plaintiff expected this to

occur again and asked Anderson for a closing

8

state~ent

on August 15,

See Footnote No. 2, supra.
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1978.

However, Anderson told the Plaitniff that a closing state-

ment wasn't necessary and never did provide one to the Plaintiff
despite repeated requests by the Plaintiff (Tr. 96, 122, 257-264,
284).

By failing to use a~ attorney, Anderson caused the Plaintiff

to part with his assets without receiving collateral and a signed
agreement requiring JCM to pay off the Plaintiff's obligations
(Tr. 415).

Morely v. J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, supra.

In Finding No. 26, the court found that Anderson had a duty
to investigate the solvency of JCM and breached said duty.

The

court.further found that the Plaintiff was justified in not making
his own investigation because of assurances made by Anderson (R. 237;
Finding No. 26).

The Plaintiff testified that Anderson told him

on July 17 that "money was no problem with these people" (Tr. 139140);

tha~

the buyers were worth seven and one-half million dollars

(Tr. 153); that on or about July 19, 1978, he specifically asked
Anderson to check into the buyer's solvency and that Anderson thereafter reported back that the buyers were worth three and one-half
million net worth (Tr. 154); and that on August 14, 1978 Anderson
had assured him while standing over his shoulder, that collateral
wasn't necessary and that the unsecured notes he was receiving were
as "good as gold" (Tr. 88, 164, 282-283).

The Plaintiff and a Moab

bank manager both testified that Anderson had told bank personel
that the buyers were financially sound (Tr. 289, 396).

In light of

the foregoing, there clearly was substantiated evidence to support
a finding that Anderson had a duty to investigate the buyer's solvency.

Anderson admitted that he made no investigation and thereby

breached his duty (Tr. 105, 109-110, 415)~

The Plaintiff testified

that he had complete trust in Anderson and the court found the
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Plaintiff's reliance to be justified, particularly since Anderson
never told the Plaintiff that he was not representing him (Tr. 165,
282-283, 417).

The foregoing representations were made by Anderson

as a licensed real estate agent and no independent investigation
by the Plaintiff was required by law.

Smith v: Carroll Realty

Company, 8 Utah 2d 356, 335 P2d 67 (1959); Dugan v. Jones, supra.
In Finding No. 38 the court fciund that Anderson had a duty
to prevent the Plaintiff from accepting unsecured notes and from
parting with his assets without proper collateral being provided to
assure payment, andthat by preparing unsecured notes and allowing
the Plaintiff to part with his assets without collateral Anderson
breached said duty.

This Finding is related to prior findings

already discussed and will not be further elaborated upon except to
note again that Anderson did not merely permit the Plaintiff to
give away his property.

To the contrary, Anderson prepared the

documents and encouraged the Plaintiff to sign the deeds and accept
the worthless note while standing over his shoulder and assuring
him that collateral was not necessary (Tr. 282-283).
In Finding No. 29 the court found that Anderson had the duty
to investigate into who J. G. Realty was.

This duty is supported

by Anderson's assurances to the Plaintiff that the $5,000.00
earnest money would be properly held in trust by Gleason and that
the Plaintiff did not need to worry about receiving it (Tr. 149-152).
In Fact, the Plaintiff did need to worry since $5,000.00 was never
placed in the J. G. Realty trust account and the Plaintiff was
actually paid the $5,000.00 with his own money (Tr. 171).
The record is replete with evidence to support the court's
findings.

However, rather than restate what has already been set
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forth, the Court is respectfully referred to the Statement of Facts
for further information.

The trial court's findings and judgment

are supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, should be
accepted and upheld by this Court.

Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632

P2d 815 (1981).
CONCLUSION
The findings and judgment of the trial court are supported
by substantial evidence and no prejudicial error of law occurred
during the course of .the trial.

Therefore, the Plaintiff's judg-

ment against United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation, should be
affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted this

g ~day

of

@~

;pr

'

1982.

~~~~~

PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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